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FOREWORD
The Space Transportation System Two (STS-2) was the second of the four planned
manned orbital flight tests (OFT) of the Space Shuttle Program. This mission,
though shorter than anticipated due to inflight fuel cell problems, was suc-
cessfully completed on November 14, 1981, demonstrating for the first time in
the history of space flight the reusable capabilities of a space vehicle.
The primary objective of the OFT program is to evaluate and demonstrate, under
progressively demanding conditions, safe ascent, on-orbit operation, and
return of the Orbiter and crew. In addition to the aerodynamic evaluations, a
scientific payload (OSTA-I) and several individual experiments were included
in medical support logistics involving concepts for a standardized program to
be utilized during the mature STS operations.
The STS-2 mission presented the NASAmedical team with a series of operational
problems associated with the on-board potable water and altered work/rest
cycles. The first problem was traced inflight to a malfunctioning fuel cell,
while the second was attributed to modification of inflight crew timelines in
order to maximize the scientific data acquisition. Shortened sleep periods,
heavy work loads, inadequate time allocation for food preparation and consump-
tion, and estimated low water intake, though tolerable for a 54-hour mission,
would have been unacceptable for a longer mission. A contingency plan was
developed to restructure inflight timelines and institute corrective health
maintenance procedures in the event that the mission was extended beyond 54
hours. Minor losses of medical data occurred as a result of the shortened
mission duration. All phases of the mission required real time re-evaluation,
identification of potential impact on pre-existing medical constraints, and
development of appropriate recommendations and solutions. These activities
required significant coordination among the different teams involved in
medical operations.
The role of Life Sciences continues to expand with each new orbital flight.
While Medical Operations was the only discipline of Life Sciences involved in
the first STS mission, the STS-2 included another element of the Life Sciences
programs, a flight experiment dealing with plant biology.
A more detailed discussion of the medical problems encountered during this
mission is presented in the various chapters of this report.
Arnauld E. Nicogossian, M.D.
Manager, Operational Medicine
Life Sciences Division
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Introduction
The Space TransportationSystem Two (STS-2)was launchedon November12, 1981,
at 10:10 AM EST from the KennedySpace Center (KSC) launch pad 39A. The launch
was initiallyscheduledfor November 4, 1981. However, a hold at T-minus 31
seconds for out-of-tolerancemeasurementscould not be resolved in order to
support the scheduledlaunch time. Subsequentevaluation of the lubrication
oil pressureof the auxillarypower units (APU) 1 and 3 resulted in a decision
to delay the launch until the APU's 1 and 3 could be flushed and the filters
replaced. On November 11, the revised flight schedule of November 12 was
placed in some jeopardy by the malfunction of one of Columbia's multiplexer
units. A unit from Challenger,scheduledfor launch in late 1982, was flown
to KSC; launch did occur at the revisedscheduletime.
The Commanderof the mission was Joe Henry Engle, Colonel, United States Air
Force, and the Pilot was RichardH. Truly, Captain,United States Navy.
The STS-2 Missionmarked the beginningof the era of reusableShuttlevehicles
with the refurbishedColumbiamaking its second space flight,carryinga space
application payload and the remote manipulator. The Mission had a planned
duration of approximately5 days and 4 hours. However, fuel cell 1 failure
resultedin a decisionto shortenthe mission to minimummission guidelinesof
about 54-1/2 hours. The Columbialanded at the NASA's Dryden Flight Research
Facilityat Edwards Air Force Base Runway 23, 2 days, 6 hours, and 13 minutes
into the mission. After a rollout of about 7,500 feet the spacecraftcame to
rest exactlyon the centerlineof the runway.
The primaryobjectiveof the OFT program is to evaluate and demonstrate,under
progressivelydemanding conditions,the safe ascent, on-orbit operation, and
return of the Orbiter and crew. During the STS-2 shortenedmission over 90
percent of the high priority flight tests were sucessfullyaccomplished. The
remote manipulatorsystem tests were successfulas was the Earth observation
data collectionby the OSTA-1 pallet experiments.
The STS-2 mission also demonstratedimportantdesignsin operationalcapabili-
ties with the continuationof all major flight operations,includinga suc-
cessful return,in the presenceof a significantsubsystemfailure. All other
subsystemsof the Orbiteroperated satisfactorily.
The STS-2 mission presentedthe followingmedicalproblems:
- marginal on-boardpotablewater causedby a malfunctioningfuel cell
- altered work/rest cycles by crew to maximize the scientific data
acquisition
- inadequatetime allocationfor food preparationand consumption
- low water intakeby crew members becauseof fuel cell problem.
This report will describe all medically related activities,ranging from pre-
flight through postfliqht. This representsa detailedreport,as a follow-on,
supplementingand amplifyingthe generalmedical assessmentof the STS-2 mis-
sion published by NASA Headquarters, January 29, 1982 (PostflightMission
Operations Report No. E-989-81-02). Also, for background,see STS-1 Medical
Report,TM 58240 publishedDecember1981.
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EVALUATIONOF CREWHEALTH
Charles K. LaPinta, M.D. and Craig L. Fischer, M.D.
As with STS-1, the basic philosophy for this mission was directed toward
routine crew health maintenance and the implementation of a sophisticated
Emergency Medical System. The preflight health of the crewmen, CommanderJoe
H. Engle and Pilot Richard H. Truly, was unremarkable. Inflight, the crew
experienced several problems: lack of proper sleep; lack of desired food
intake; and reduced fluid intake secondary to a failure in the potable water
supply system. Despite these problems, the crewmen recovered rapidly
postflight and have suffered no lasting untoward effects. They were returned
to full duty including pilot in commandof NASAhigh performance aircraft four
days post landing.
The STS-2 Medical Program was designed to safeguard the health and _vell-being
of all astronauts assigned to the mission as well as their families and co-
workers who might have regular and close contact with the crewmen. This was
accomplished, as in STS-I, by the same program elements, specifically:
Health Stabilization Program
Critical Personnel Reliability Program
Preflight and Postflight Medical Flight Crew Evaluation
Inflight Medical Consultation via Mission Control Center (MCC) Surgeons
Implementation of an Emergency Medical System at all Potential Launch and
Landing Sites
Preflight examinations were accomplished on September I0, 1981 (F-30 exam),
October 21, 1981 (F-IO exam), November 4, 1981 (day of aborted launch), and
November 12, 1981 (launch day). Postflight exams were performed on November
4, 1981 (recovery day at the Dryden Flight Research Facility). The Crew
Physician, Charles K. LaPinta, M.D. and Deputy Crew Physician, Craig L.
Fischer, M.D., performed all preflight and postflight examinations.
In accordance with JSC medical policy, both crewmen used medication for space
motion sickness prophylaxis. CommanderEngle chose the combination scopola-
mine and dexedrine (0.4 mg and 5 mg respectively) capsule, and Pilot Truly
chose the scopolamine patch which he applied in the crew quarters at KSC
approximately 13 hours prior to lift-off and replaced once in flight. He
removed the second scopolamine patch prior to reentry when he suspected some
side effects from the medication.
About noon the day of recovery, word was sent from JSC that the crewmen might
not be in optimal physical condition at landing time because of four problems:
neither crewman had slept more than 2.5 hours (uninterrupted) during the
mission (due to the many alarms and warnings received); and both crewmen did
not consume a normal amount of fluids because the potable water supply failed
to function properly. There seemed to be an inordinateamount of gas in the
water, and it took an excessivelength of time to obtain.Therefore,the crew
drank less than they should have. This underhydrationled to severe thirst
near the end of the mission. It should also be noted that the crew never had
time to eat a full meal and subsistedon snacks and "grabbinga sandwich or
something"when time permitted.
The postflight physical examinationswere performed in adjoining rooms with
the Deputy Crew Physican doing Pilot Truly's physicaland the Crew Physician
doing CommanderEngle's. The exam sequencewas:
o MedicalDebrief
o Microbiology
o Weight
o Stand Test
o B1ood Draw
o PhysicalExam
Just prior to the physical examinationa formal medical debriefingwas held.
The questions asked were obtainedfrom a list read by each examiner. The
crew's replies were recorded on cassette recorders. The examinations were
accomplishedexpeditiouslyand smoothly.
At the time of examinationboth crewmen appeared fatigued and underhydrated.
After replenishmentof their fluid deficit, they rapidlyrecoveredand by two
hours post landingwere clinicallynormal. No residualeffectsof the mission
were observed on the recovery plus three day examinationand the crew was
returnedto full flight status.
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INFLIGIIT OBSERVATIONS
Michael W. Bungo, M.D.
The launch of STS-2, which was scheduled for November 4, 1981, was aborted at
T-31 seconds because of difficulties with the auxillary power unit. Actual
launch was postponed and occurred on Thursday, November 12, 1981, from the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). There was no resident fatigue or apprehension in
the crew on launch day which might have been attributable to the prior delays.
The crew awoke at 5:10 a.m. EST (316:11:10:00 GMT).* The medical staffing of
Mission Control began at approximately the same time with the Staff Support
Room (SSR) establishing the communication lines to KSC. The Mission Operation
Control Room (MOCR) Surgeon received a briefing on the crew health from the
Crew Physician at 12:47. No problems were reported, and the crew had
ingressed the Orbiter without difficulty (12:33). The pilot (PLT) was usin!] a
transdermal scopolomine patch for prophylactic therapy of vestibular space
sickness and applied this preparation the night before. The co_nander (CDR)
was to use an oral scopolomine/dexedrine combination and was to receive his
first dose on orbit. This was in contrast to the aborted flight 8 days
earlier when the CDR took a dosage at breakfast. The hatch was closed at
13:22 and lift-off occurred at 15:10.
At 16:40, the MOCRSurgeon and Biomedical Engineer (BME) were informed that a
major solar flare was in progress. There was possible concern for the atten-
dant implications. Projections, however, limited crew exposure to 50 millirad
from the protons encountered in the South Atlantic Anomaly, and radiation was
not of further concern for the remainder of the flight. By 17:36 (the
Australia pass on the first orbit), it was evident that there were problems
with one of the fuel cells. Over the next few hours this problem was to have
impact in: I) shortening the mission, and 2) causing re-routing of the pot-
able water supply to lessen the possiblity to potassium hydroxide contamina-
tion.
Because they were busily working spacecraft related problems and test proce-
dures, the crew hastily ate only sandwiches for lunch on launch day.
At 19:35, the crew reported on the open loop that although they both felt
fullness in the head, they were otherwise well. Again at 20:49, the crew
reported that in spite of the busy workload, they "both feel real well". The
cabin temperature was reading in the mid-to-high 80's on the groundbased indi-
cators, but because of previous cold problems on STS-I and because the STS-2
crew felt comfortable, this indicator was not felt to represent conditions
accurately, and no action was taken.
*Note: All subsequent times in this report will be in Greenwich Mean Time
(day:hour:minute; or just, hour:minute). Launch was at I0:I0 A.M. EST or
316:16:10:00 GMT.
Conferenceswere held off the loop combiningthe inputs of the Flight Direc-
tor, EECOM, and the MOCR Surgeon to remedy the potassium hydroxide (KOH)
spillageinto the potablewater system. EECOM estimatedKOH concentrationto
be no greater than 2%. The surgeonconstructeda plan to test the pH of the
drinking water by using the urine test sticks that were packaged in the
on-board medical kit. The Flight Director decided that the time course
involvedin the testingprocedure,in spite of its simplicity,was too great a
constraint on the minimum timeline. Water was drawn directly from the func-
tional fuel cells, unless large quantities were needed, in which case, the
potablewater tank was to be used without testing.
The second day of the mission went without incident as the crew tested the
remotemanipulatorsystem (RMS). They were feeling none the worse from their
first day's ordeal, were able to eat, and appeared to be in reasonable
condition as viewed on downlinkedTV transmissions. It was during this day
that they were informedof the decisionto terminatethe missionearly.
The noise survey and whole gas sampling,which had been deletedfrom the time-
line of day one were requestedto be completedon this second day.
President Ronald Reagan visited the MOCR between 318:00:15and 318:00:28and
communicatedwith the crew of STS-2. Crew sleep was again interruptedon the
second night by multiplecaution and warning alarms. It was estimatedthat no
more than 2 3/4 hours of uninterruptedcontinuoussleep occurred. Total sleep
may have been 6-7 hours.
On entry day, the timelinewas extremelybusy for the crew. No electrocardio-
graphic (ECG) data was obtained from either crewmember as late as the last
Australia pass. The BME verified that all ground systems and apparently all
spacecraft systems were functioningnormally. As a consequence,the Flight
Directorwas asked to determinewhetherthe crew had indeeddonned and plugged
in their biomedical harnesses. Soon thereafter,ECG data was downlinkedon
the CDR, but even after a second reminderto check the biomed cable connector,
no data was obtained on the PLT. Since persistentlyelevatedheart rates were
noted and concern for the cardiovascularstatus of the CDR was in evidence,
the Johnson Space Center EmergencyMedicalServicesSystem (EMSS)coordinator,
with the recognitionof the MOCR Surgeon,called the Crew Physicianat Edwards
Air Force Base and advised that he be prepared for a fatigued, hypovolemic
crew. The crew egressedthe Orbiter at 22:05 lookingsomewhatfatigued.
The MOCR Surgeonswere faced with severaloperationalproblems: 1) the use of
additionalmedicationby a crev_nemberfor motion sicknessprophylaxis; 2) the
need for other flight controllersto be aware of crew medical/comfortconcerns
such as, potable water, cabin temperature,caution and warning alarms, and
timeline workloads. None of the above precludeda successfulmission, yet,
the medical/human system will respond uniquely to changing events, and
heightenedawarenessto these variablesis in order.
4
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CREWMEDICALTRAININGAND
SHUTTLEORBITERMEDICALSYSTEM
James M. Vanderploeg, M.D. and Arthur T. Hadley, III, M.D.
The objective of the crew medical training for STS-2 was to provide the prime
and backup crews with the knowledge and skills necessary to respond to
inflight illnesses and injuries in an appropriate and timely manner. This
objective was met through both the general medical training which is part of
each astronaut's initial training and mission specific training in the months
prior to STS-2.
Each astronaut's initial medical training involved 16 hours of instruction
during the first year following selection.
Included during the first year of training was the initial two-day course in
altitude physiology. This course provided training in the following areas:
composition of the atmosphere; the Gas Laws; signs, symptoms and treatment of
hypoxia; operation of life support equipment; effects of increased G's; the
L-I and M-I anti-G maneuvers; use of the anti-G suit; and an altitude chamber
ride with demonstration of hypoxia. This material is reviewed every three
years by means of a one-day refresher course. In addition to the above
training, astronauts Engle and Mattingly received detailed medical briefings
that had been a part of mission preparation during the Apollo program. These
briefings were designed to acquaint the crewmembers with pre and postflight
medical procedures; to discuss crew preventive medicine measures; to instruct
the crew in the contents and uses of the medical kit; to demonstrate the con-
figuration and operation of the biomedical harness; and to familiarize the
crew with toxicological considerations.
The STS-2 premission medical training for astronauts Engle and Truly began in
mid-1979 when they were designated as the backup crew for STS-I. The first
training acomplished was the self study course entitled MED EQ 2102. This
involved each crewmember working through the "Medical Equipment Workbook".
The topics covered in this workbook were: (i) the Shuttle Orbiter Medical
System (SOMS): contents, uses, location, and stowage; (2) the Operational
Bioinstrumentation System (OBS): components, donned configuration and
on-orbit contingency use; (3) the Anti-Gravity Suit (AGS): components and
pressure controller operation; and (4) the Radiation Equipment: components,
locations and on-orbit contingency use.
Following completion of MED EQ 2102 Engle and Truly were given 9 hours of
medical procedures training in three courses entitled MEDPROC2102, 2201, and
2301.
The premission medical training for astronauts Mattingly and Hartsfield
included the workbook self-study course MEDEQ 2102 described above. This was
followed with an intensive 3 1/2 hour training session on October 2, 1981.
The Shuttle Orbiter Medical System (SOMS-A) is an outgrowth of onboard medical
kits which have been in use throughout the history of manned space flight.
The STS-1 Medical Report contains a brief summaryof previousmedicalkits and
training.
SOMS-A was designedfor use during the Orbital Flight Tests to provide treat-
ment capability for life-threateningemergenciesand to permit diagnosis and
treatmentof many less severe illnessesand injuries. The inventoryof the
SOMS-A is intendedto sustainthe medical needs of a two-mancrew for up to 14
days.
The following is a partial listing of the contents of the SOMS kit. A com-
plete listing can be found in the STS-1 Medical Report, NASA Technical
Memorandum58240.
Deleted: (Drugs) Drug ConcentrationChanges:
"'Sudafed Lidocaine(20 mg/cc • 40 mg/cc)
Periactin Dalmane (15 mg • 30 mg)
Phenergan/Dexedrine Tylenol (#3• Plain)
Erythromycin 3 Phenergan25 mg/cc• 2
PencillinV.K. Phenergan50 mg/cc
Ampicillin
Dulcolax Non-drugAdditions:
Donnatal 2 HeparinLocks
Valium 1/2" Roll Dermiceltape
Cepacol 5 4x4 s
Robitussin 1 3" Ace Bandage
AminophyllineSuppositories 1 Nasostat
Aramine 10 Telfa Pads
Pronestyl 1 Needle (22 Ga; 1.5")
Vistaril 1 Magnifying glass
Demerol
1 Atropine Non-drugRemovals:
Halotex 1 Su'rgicalMask
Neosporin 1 Binocular Loupe
Neocortef 1 Foley Catheter
Pontoncaine 2 IV Butterflies
Absorbtear 4 ft. I.V. Tape
1 IV Tubing
Added: (Drugs)
---_oxiciIlin Changes:
Terbutaline All 2x2 Gauze pads• 4x4
1 Epinephrine Gauze pads
4 Bupivacaine PVP Iodinewipes• PVP
1 Isoproterenol Iodineswabs
1 Heparin
1 Lidocaine
1 Morphine
Polysporin
Ophthocort
Proparacaine
Tears Naturale
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HEALTHSTABILIZATIONPROGRAM
James K. Ferguson, Ph.D.
The Health Stabilization Program was altered for the STS-2 mission to a level
I effort. Level I is an educational program which creates health awareness
among the personnel entering crew work areas. The STS-2 mission was the first
time a Level I Health Stabilization Program was conducted. Measures were
taken that were designed to develop an increased health awareness among those
persons working in crew areas. Posters, signs, and information sheets were
placed in work areas. Information sheets were also distributed. Briefings
were given to the flight crewmembers which recommended illness prevention
measures. Since work areas were not restricted to primary contacts, special
crew travel routes were established to prevent accidental exposures. All
persons who were known to have to be within six feet of a crewmember during
the seven days immediately prior to launch were identified as Primary Contacts
and badged. Medical consultation was made available to all personnel who
worked in crew areas. Security was not used in the work areas or for crew
movement from place to place. Health protection for the crew was based on
personnel compliance to program recommendations.
The STS-2 Health Stabilization Program was started at 0800 on October 28,
1981, and continued to November 12, 1981.
Table 1
Number, Type, and Location of Primary Contacts
Type JSC KSC Headquarters Subtotal
NASA 97 12 6 115
Contractor 33 7 0 40
Others 9 0 0 9
Subtotal 139 19 6 164 Grand Total
Only three illness reports were received from the 164 Primary Contacts during
the 14 days of program operation. This is an illness rate of nine per I000
per week compared to a rate of 28 illnesses reported per I000 per week on the
STS-I mission. Each of the three illness reports was a different illness
type.
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VALIDATIONOF PREDICTIVETESTSAND
COUNTERMEASURESFORSPACEMOTIONSICKNESS
Jerry L. Homick, Ph.D.
Experiencefrom previousmanned space flight indicatesthat if no corrective
actions are taken up to 40% of Shuttle crewmemberscould experience some
degree of spacesickness during the first few days of flight. Because of its
complexity and uniqueness this biomedical problem cannot be resolved solely
with ground based research. To obtain final and valid solutionsit is essen-
tial that data be collected systematicallyon individuals who fly Space
Shuttlemissions.
A Detailed SupplementalObjective (DSO) was developed to initiate this data
collectionprocesswith the STS-1 mission. A nearly identicalDSO was imple-
mented for the STS-2 mission. A primaryobjectiveof this DSO was to conduct
inflight observations, supported by a series of pre and postflight data
collection procedures,on STS-2 crewmembersin an effort to validate ground
based tests which may be predictive of susceptibilityto the space motion
sickness syndrome. An additional objective was to implement crew testing
procedures which would enable acquisitionof data to be used in validating
motion sicknesscountermeasures.
At approximatelyF-300 days each crewmembercompleteda questionnairedesigned
to elicit pertinent informationregarding past experienceswith the various
types of motion environmentsand responsesto those environments. The ques-
tionnaire indicated that both crewmembers had a minimal history of motion
sickness susceptibility. During approximatelythe F-300 to F-270 period of
time the crewmemberswere tested for susceptibilityto experimentallyinduced
motion sickness in the JSC NeurophysiologyLaboratory. The standardCoriolis
Sickness SusceptibilityIndex (CSSI) test was used. The results indicated
that they both had moderatelyhigh resistanceto terrestrialmotion sickness.
BetweenapproximatelyF-330 and F-270 days both crewmembersconferredwith the
STS-2 Crew Physicianto select a preferred anti-motion sickness medication.
The medication was administeredto them under operational conditions e.g.,
Shuttle simulatortraining to determine any adverse reactions. The efficacy
of the selectedmedicationwas confirmedby using the CSSI test.
In accordancewith the NASA medical operationspolicy for the prophylaxisand
treatment of space motion sickness, both crewmembers utilized anti-motion
sicknessmedicationduring the early phase of the mission. One of the crewmen
experiencedwhat may have been moderatemotion sicknesssymptomatologyduring
the first day of flight only. Neither crewmen reported any vestibular
disturbancesduring landingor postflight.
8
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CREW CARDIOVASCULARPROFILE
Michael W. Bungo,M.D.
As part of the OrbitalFlightTest (OFT) program,STS-2, like its predecessor,
STS-1, was designed to verify the operation of the Space Shuttle systems.
Cardiovasculardata were, therefore, collected in a manner which would have
minimal impacton crew activitieswhile still having some predictivevalue.
The two-man crew of Columbia consisted of the pilot (PLT) and the commander
(CDR); data collectionwas identical for both. Heart rates were monitored
during the ascent phase and during entry accordingto methods describedin the
STS-1Medical Report (NASA TechnicalMemorandum58240).
A "stand test" was performedon the 22nd day before flight (F-22)and within 1
hour after the crew egressed the Orbiter upon landing (L+O). This test was
used as a clinicalmaneuver to elicit orthostaticintolerance. The heart rate
was monitored continuously by ECG and the blood pressure obtained by
sphygmomanometryeach minute for a total of 15 minutes. During the first 5
minutes, the crewman was at supine rest; during the next 5 minutes, he was
seated with his ankles, knees, and hips each flexed at 90°; and during the
last 5 minutes, he was requiredto stand uprightwithoutother movement.
_laximumheart rates for both crewmenoccurredduring the periodwhen the solid
rocket boosters were ignited (launch through "SRB sep."). Other peaks
occurred at external tank separation(just after main engine cutoff), during
the OrbitalManeuveringSystem (OMS) 1 burn, and approximately22 minutes into
the timeline over the Madrid tracking station. These pychologically/physi-
ologicallystressfulevents correlateextremelywell with what was seen during
STS-1, even to the acceleratedheart rates noted over Madrid at a time one
would not have predictedthis workload.
If the body weight decreasescan be assumed to represent purely single com-
par_ent fluid losses, then the PLT lost 28% of his blood volume or 9% of his
extracellularfluid. The CDR on the other hand, would have lost 58% of his
blood volume or 19% of his extracellularfluid. In actuality,the functional
intravascularvolume deficit is likely between these extremes and indeed may
even vary as "G" load varies.
The volume deficitsfor the PLT are very similaror only slightlygreaterthan
those seen in STS-1 (a flight of equal duration although less complicated).
The data for the CDR must be consideredwith the individualcase but also as a
likely scenario in futuremedical operations.
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BIOCHEMISTRYAND ENDOCRINOLOGY
Carolyn S. Leach
The biochemistry and endocrinology studies were conducted to provide data
which, when integrated with information from other medical disciplines, permit
an objective assessment of the individual crewman's health. Additionally, the
data collected during the preflight phase of the Shuttle mission provided
baseline information for the medical team in detecting and identifying
postflight physiological changes which may have resulted from exposure to the
space flight environment. The results of these tests not only helped in the
clinical assessment of the crewmen but also provided data to compare to
previously acquired results on men returning from 2 days in space.
The results show postflight decreases below preflight findings for trigly-
cerides, Mg, Na, K, and AST for both crewman. Postflight increases above
preflight values were observed in glucose, cholesterol, BUN, uric acid,
bilirubin, calcium, osmolarity, alkaline phos., CPK, angiotensin I, aldo-
sterone, insulin, T3, T4, HGH, ACTH, and LDH. The LDH increases in both
crewmen were predominantly the LD4 and 5 bands which causes a pattern in which
the first two bands are relatively lower than normal.
The postflight 24-hour urine results showed decreases in Na, K, CI, Mg, and
increases in excretion of cortisol, aldosterone, epinephrine, and
norepinephrine when compared to preflight control values.
The test results of STS-2 crewmen were similar to the findings on recovery of
previous space flight crews. Table I shows the percent differences of the
STS-2 crew's postflight findings compared to preflight values, the percent
difference of the post to preflight comparison for the STS-I crew and the
postflight findings on the Apollo crewmen who spent an average of 12 days in
space compared to their preflight values. This comparison leads one to the
conclusion that the Apollo crewmen probably underwent the most dramatic
changes within the first two days of exposure to space flight. Furthermore,
these findings on the Shuttle crewmen support the hypothesis that the changes
in fluid and electrolyte metabolism probably occur within hours of reaching
orbit as have been shown in ground simulation.
I0
TABLE 1
Apollo Immediate STS-1 Immediate STS-2 Immediate
Postflight Postflight Postflight
% from Preflight % from Preflight % from Preflight
Parameter Mean Mean Mean
Osmolal ity -0.7 -0.5 5.0
Na -0.4 -1.0 -1.0
K -7.3 -6.8 -12.8I 0 6 I.0 3.0
Ca 1.0 1.8 6.8
Mg -5.0 -2.5 -4.8
o11.9 25.5 1.7
Creatinine 8.3 9.3 10.7
G1ucose 9.8 1.0 2.6
Tri gl yceri des -24.3 -31.0 -32.0
Cholesterol -6.0 -3.0 17.0
Uric Acid -14.8 -22.0 12.0
Total Bil irubin 12.5 -12.5 113.0
Alkaline Phosphatase 2.8 1.3 18.0
Lactic Acid Dehydrogenase -10.1 5.3 27.0
SGOT(AST) -4.2 -14.3 -55.0
Creatine Phosphokinase -11.3 -6.0 61.0
Angiotensin I 488.0 80.0 275.0
Corti sol -27.0 -II. 0 92.0
Insulin 32.0 81.0 362.0
T3 -I.0 3.3 -5.0T. 12.0 11.5 31.0
H 304.0 5.5 30.0
ACTH -24.0 54.8 -24.0
ii
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HEMATOLOGICALAND IMMUNOLOGICALNALYSIS
Gerald R. Taylor, Ph.D.
Hematological and immunological analyses were conducted on the primary and
backup crewmembers of STS-2 so that body-function values necessary for the
ob,iective assessment of the health status of the crew before launch and
immediately after flight could be evaluated by the medical staff. Blood
samples were collected by venipuncture from the two prime and two backup
crewnembers 62, 22, i0, and 2 days before flight (F-62, F-22, F-IO, F-2,
respectively). Additionally, blood samples were collected from the two prime
crewmembers directly after landing and a.gain 4 days later (L+O, L+4, respec-
tively). Further specifications are glven in "Clincial Laboratory Support
Plan for Orbital Flight Test (OFT) Missions" (JSC-14374).
The results of analyses conducted on the cellular blood components of the
primary and backup crewmembers demonstrate that for the one-month period
preceding the flight, there were no unusual variations in the cellular blood
components of the four cre_members. However, there were important alterations
in both primary crewmembers after the flight.
A marked postflight hemoconcentration, which reflects the overall body dehy-
dration is illustrated by an increase in the erythrocyte count, increased
hemoglobin concentration, and increased hematocrit. The postflight increase
in erythrocyte count was 2 1/2 times greater than that which could be
explained by the change in the hematocrit, suggesting that the increase in red
blood cells was due to another mechanism in addition to simple loss of fluid
from peripheral blood. The difference can be shown to be due to a decrease in
erythrocyte size (MCV}. This volume decrease is likely the result of a change
in the dynamic osmotic balance which would cause loss of water into the more
concentrated extracellular fluid. Explanatory calculations are outlined
below:
o Within the population (n=2) there was a postflight mean increase of
11.8% in the erythrocyte count per unit volume (actually an 11.8%
decrease in diluent)
o Simultaneously, there was a mean decrease of 5.4% in the average
erythrocyte volume (MCV).
o Therefore if cell Number X cell size = Packed cell volume, 111.8% x
94.6% = 105.76%.
o Accordingly, we would expect the hematocrit to be 5.76% greater
postflight. The actual mean postflight increase in hematocrit was
5.95% above the preflight mean. The proximity of these values
verifies the analysis.
A second phenomenon which may or may not be related to the total body deydra-
tion is reflected in the postflight increase in peripheral leukocytes which
when divided into its components illustrated a marked increase in neutrophils
concurrent with a considerable decrease in lymphocytes and eosinophils.
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Typically there is a diurnal increase in the number of neutrophilsinto the
peripheral circulationas the work cycle progresses. However, increases of
the magnitude shown here indicate an unusual demarginationof neutrophils
resulting in a major shift from the marginated granulocyte pool to the
circulating granulocyte pool. Such shifts are generally associated with
vigorous exercise, pain, stress, nausea, anxiety, anoxia, or unusual mental
activity. These same affectorstypicallymediate a transientlymphocytopenia
and eosinopenia. Both lymphocytes and eosinophils demonstrated a marked
absolute decrease postflight.
Cell-lmmunologicalActivity: Lymphocytesextracted from crew blood samples
were reacted with the mitogen Phytohemagglutinin(PHA) to assess the compe-
tence of the in vitro immune response. After a suitable incubation period,
the blastogenlc response was measured by determining the incorporationof
radioactivethymidineinto newly formed DNA. The data show that there was a
significant (p _< 0.01) decrease in the ability of lymphocytesto respond to
mitogenic assault postflight as shown in Figure 1. Further, the data show
that the deviationwas only partiallyrecoveredby 4 days after landing. It is
possiblethat this effect is the result of selectivemarginationof T-lympho-
cyte subsetswhich are selectivelyrespondingto the stress by alteringtheir
relativeabundancewithin the circulatingpool and the sequesteredpool.
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MEDICALMICROBIOLOGYOF CREWMEMBERSANDSPACECRAFT
Duane L. Pierson, Ph.D.
The reuse of a spacecraft requires careful microbial monitoring of the vehicle
to evaluate the effectiveness of the interim cleanup procedures. The
Microbial Contamination Plan implemented for STS-I was followed for STS-2.
The plan consists of specimen collection and subsequent evaluation of the
crewmembers and the Orbiter including the interior surfaces, air, potable
water and foodstuffs.
Crew Microbiology
Staphylococcus aureus was the most prevalent potential pathogen isolated from
the ears, nose, and throat specimens. The only other medically important
bacteria isolated from these sites were the Gram negative rods, Enterobacter
aerogenes and Acinetobacter calcoaceticus. The prime commander appeared to
carry Candida parapsilosis in one or both ears during both pre and postflight
examinations. Candida albicans was isolated from the backup pilot's throat on
one occasion. No potentially pathogenic microbes were isolated from the
backup commander. The microorganisms isolated from the ears, nose, and
throat specimens of the crewmen were not particularly unusual, and the flight
crew experienced no clinical symptoms associated with these microbes.
An alpha-hemolytic streptococci was isolated from the urine specimens of both
the prime commander and the prime pilot during the F-IO and F-2 sampling
periods. The total number of bacteria cultured from the urine specimens was
within acceptable units. No ova or parasites were observed in the the fecal
samples of both crews, and C. albicans and Aspergillus terreus were the only
medically important microorganisms isolated.
No significant increases or changes in microbial flora were observed in the
prime crewmen subsequent to landing. No detectable exchange of microbes
between crewmen was observed.
Spacecraft Microbiology
Two different S. aureus strains were isolated from the interior surfaces of
the Orbiter. One strain was phage type 79 and the other strain was untypable.
These potentially pathogenic strains of S. aureus were important because of
their isolation location. Type 79 was found on the water dispenser barrel.
The food warmer was the site of the other staphylococcal strain. Enterobacter
agglomerans was the only other medically important bacteria isolated from the
surface sites. However, ten different species of the fungal genus, aspergil-
lus, were isolated from the twenty surface sites. These fungi are probably
best characterized as potential pathogens under compromising physiological
conditions of the human host.
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FOODAND NUTRITION
Richard L. Sauer and Rita M. Rapp
The objective of the STS-2 food system was to provide a safe, nutritious food
Supply within the various biomedical, operational, and engineering con-
straints. The food system was designed to be in a convenient, acceptable form
which would allow easy manipulation in the null-gravity environment and
require a minimum amount of time and effort for both preparation and cleanup.
The standard menu of OFT flights is shown in Table i. Food stowed aboard
Columbia for STS-2 began with meal B on day 1 and continued through meal B on
day 6. The pantry for STS-2 is listed in Table 2. The pantry is used on each
flight to accommodate individual food preferences and also to function as a
contingency food supply in case the mission is extended. On a nominal mission
pantry items serve as extra beverages and snacks. Pantry items may also be
exchanged for menu items.
Food types and packages used on STS-2 were the same as those used on STS-I
(i). Frozen corned beef sandwiches were prepared in the Johnson Space Center
(JSC) Food Facility and transported to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Water
was placed in two flight beverage packages the day before launch and refrig-
erated. On launch morning the beverage packages and frozen sandwiches were
placed in each astronaut's space suit pocket for their first inflight
snack.
Preflight food service was provided for the STS-2 prime and backup crews dur-
ing Countdown Demonstration Test (CDDT) and the Health Stabilization Period.
Meals were prepared and served at both the JSC Preflight Food Facility and the
KSC crew quarters. The preflight food service was extended one week due to
the launch delay and transferred back to JSC from KSC when the crews returned
to Houston.
Inflight nutrient intake was estimated from an inventory of the returned used
and unused packages of food. Food packages that were used were all returned
together in a trash bag. Packages were not labeled in any way according to
crewman use. Visual estimates were made of any food residues. Missing food
packages were assumed not to have been used and were not included in the
nutrient calculations. Estimated STS-2 Inflight Nutrient Intake is presented
in Table 3. The mean daily nutrient calculations presume that food consump-
tion was equally distributed between the two crewmembers; however, there is no
evidence to indicate that this was the case.
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TABLE1
SHUTTLE - STANDARD OFT MENU
M,EAL DAY 11,5 DAY 2, 6 DAY 3, 7 DAY 4, 8
A Peaches (T) Applesauce (T) (IM) DriedApricots (IM)
BeefPattie (R) DriedBeef (NF) DriedPeaches (R) BreakfastRoll (I)(NF)
Scrambl_:dEggs (R) Granola (R) Sausage (R) Granolaw/Blueberries (R)
BranFla'_e_ (R) BreakfastRoll (I)(NF) ScrambledEggs (R) V.anillaInst. Brkfst (B)
Cocoa (B) Choc.Inst. Brkfst (B) Cornflakes (B) GrapefruitDrink (B)
OrangeDrink (B) Orange-GrapefruitDrk (B) Cocoa (B)
Orange-PineappleDrink
B Frankfurters (T) CornedBeef (T)(I) (T) GroundBeefw/ (T)
TurkeyTetrazzini (R) Asparagus (R) Ham (T) PickleSauce
Bread(2X) (I)(NF) Bread(2X) (I)(NF) CheeseSpread I)(NF) Noodles& Chicken (R)
Bananas (FD) Pears (T) Bread(2X) (R) StewedTomatoes (T}
AlmondCrunchBar (NF) Peanuts (NF) Gr. Beans& Broccoli (T) Pears (FD)
AppleDrink (2X) (B) Lemonade(2X) (B) CrushedPineapple (NF) Almonds (NF)
ShortbreadCookies (NF) StrawberryDrink (B)
Cashews (B)
Teaw/Lemon& Sugar(2X)
C ShrimpCocktail (R) Beefw/BBQSauce (T) (R) Tuna (T)
BeefSteak (I) Cauliflowerw/Cheese (R) Cr. MushroomSoup T)(IM) Macaroni& Cheese (R)
RicePilaf (R) Gr. Beansw/Mushrooms(R) SmokedTurkey (R) Peasw/Butter Sauce (R)
Broccoli auGratin (R) Lemon Pudding (T) Mixed Italian Vegetables (T) PeachAmbrosia (R)
Fruit Cocktail (T) PecanCookies (NF) Vanilla Pudding (R) ChocolatePudding (T)
Butterscotchpudding (T} Cocoa (B} Strawberries (B) Lemonade (B)
GrapeDrink (B) Tropical Punch
NOTE: 1 Day 1 (launchday}consistsof MealB andC only
Abbreviations
T ---Thermostabilized I --- Irradiated
IM --- IntermediateMoisture FD ---Freeze-Dried
R ---Rehydratable NF ---NaturalForm
B--- Beverage(Rehydratable)
Table 2: Pantry for ShuttleTransportSystem-2 (STS-2)
Rehydratable No. Thermostabilized No.
Beverages Food
apple drink 8 beef steak (1) 8
coffee, black 10 corned beef (1) 4
coffee,cream, and sugar 10 ham 4
grapefruitdrink 6 salmon 2
lemonade 8 smokedturkey (1) 2
orange drink 8
tea 10
Ready-to-eat No. Rehydratable No.
Snacks Food
apricots 4 asparagus 2
dried beef 4 beef patty 2
bread 4 green beans with broccoli 2
cookies, shortbread 4 green beans with mushrooms 2
food bar, granola/raisin 4 Italianvegetables 3
peaches,dried 2 peach ambrosia 2
nuts, almonds 4 potato patty 2
nuts, cashews 4 sausagepatty 2
nuts, peanuts 4 strawberries 2
peanutbutter 4
crackers 4
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TABLE 3: EstimatedSTS-2 InflightNutrient Intake
TotalIntakefor
2 Men during Meanper Man Recommendedper
nutrient Units STS-2(2days) per Day Man per Day
kcalories g 4399.0 1100.0 3000.0
Protein g 234.0 58.5 56.0
Carbohydrate g 608.2 152.0
Fat g 112.1 28.0
Water of
Rehydration ml 4530.0 1134.0
Moisture in
Food g 353.7 88.4
Calcium mg 2749.0 687.0 800.0
Phosphorus mg 3663.0 916.0 800.0
Sodium mg 7130.0 1782.0 3450.0
Magnesium mg 615.0 154.0 350.0
Iron mg 49.4 12.4 18.0
Zn mg 37.6 9.4
Potassium mg 5449.0 1362.0 2737.0
Water intake was estimated by assuming that the recommendedamount of water
was used to reconstituterehydratablefood items. Since there is no metering
device on the water dispenser,the crew cannot accuratelydeterminethe amount
of water used to rehydratefoods. In addition, it is not known how much of
the water volume was actually displacedby gas in the system. Ignoringthese
factors,water associatedwith the food consumedwas estimatedto include4500
ml as water of rehydrationand 350 ml as moisture naturallyoccurring in the
food, giving a total of 4850 ml water consumed inflight. The water from the
containerin the crewmen'ssuit pocket is includedin the water of rehydration
calculations,but this does not includeany other drinkingwater they may have
consumed inflight. Under ordinary circumstancesa reasonablewater allowance
is 1 ml/kcal for adults (2). This allowanceappears to have been met during
the STS-2 flight since it was estimatedthat a total of 4400 kcal and 4850 ml
water were consumed inflight.
The problems associatedwith the food system during STS-2 included excessive
gas in the water supply and insufficienttime to prepareand consumethe food
due to technicaland mechanicalproblemswith the spacecraft.
References
(1) NASA TechnicalMemorandum58240, December1981.
(2) National Research Council, RecommendedDietaryAllowances National
Academy of Sciences,Washington,D.C., 1980, p. 160.
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POTABLEWATER
Richard L. Sauer
To verify that the Shuttle Potable Water System provideswater that is pota-
ble, samples of water are obtained periodicallyfrom the system during its
preflight servicing, as well as postflight. These samples are analyzed to
determine the continuing chemical and microbiologicalacceptability of the
water. With the exceptionof a small amount of the Ground Support Equipment
(GSE) load water, the bulk of the water consumed inflight comes from the
operationof the fuel cells.
A major impact to the STS-2 mission was the failureof one of the fuel cells.
Becauseof the potentialof contaminationof the potablewater tank with water
from the failed fuel cell, the potablewater tank was isolated and not used
for the remainderof the flight. The result was that the water dispense rate
was limited to the fuel cell production rate of approximately12 pounds per
hour. This is equivalent to requiring about five minutes to reconstitutea
beverage container. The excessive time for beverage and food reconstitution
impacted the crew timeline. In addition, excessivegas was found to be pre-
sent in the water when it was dispensed.
A total of sixteen preflight and four postflightsamplesof water were taken
from the potablewater system for STS-2. These consistedof both chemical and
microbiologicalsamples. The specific parametersmonitored are those listed
in NASA SpecificationSE-S-O073-C "Space Shuttle Fluid Procurement and Use
Control".
o Taste and Odor - A slight odor and taste of iodine was detected in
severalpreflightsamples. The levelswere of no medical consequence.
o DissolvedGas - One preflight sample drawn from the ambientand chilled
quick disconnectsindicatedthe presenceof dissolvedgas.
o Total Bacteria -Total bacteriaexceededthe specificationlimit of zero
up to a maximum of 400 colony forming units per 100 ml (CFU/IO0ml) and
250 CFU/IO0 ml in the initial chilled and ambient water samples,
respectively. While exceedingthe limit, these levels are not considered
significant. The organismswere identifiedas Pseudomonasfluorescensand
Pseudomonas denitrificans, both being common contaminants of water.
Subsequentpreflightsamplinghad negativebacteriologicalresults.
o Yeast and Mold - The ambient water sample taken immediately after
loading the potable water tank with GSE water, which had been iodinated
3.5 hours earlierto a level of 4.75 mg/l, indicated1 CFU/IO0ml of yeast
and mold. The GSE water initiallycontaineda quantity of yeast and mold
which, in time, was destroyed by the iodine. All subsequent samples
proved free from yeast and mold.
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SHUTTLETOXICOLOGY
Wayland J. Rippstein
All of the nonmetallic materials used in the interior of the Orbiter crew com-
partment are known to outgas contaminant compounds. Early in the Shuttle
program, a materials testing program was established for determining the kinds
and amount of contaminant compounds outgassed. A record of the results of
this testing was maintained. From this record, it was learned that a signifi-
cant number of different compounds (about 400 in number) would be outgassed.
Someof these compounds could attain concentration levels above the spacecraft
maximum allowable concentration (SMAC) levels allowed by NASA Headquarters
document NHB 8060.IB, "Flammability, Odor, and Offgassing Requirements and
Test Procedures for Materials in Environments that Support Combustion". No
corrective measure for outgassing control was necessary since the environmen-
tal control life support system (ECLSS) removed significant amounts of gaseous
atmospheric contaminants from the Orbiter spacecraft cabin. The exact removal
capability for all the contaminant compounds, determined in the outgassing
testing of the candidate spacecraft materials, is not known.
By conducting a series of outgassing tests on the Orbiter crew cabin, the
atmospheric contaminant situation of the vehicle was reliably established.
This evaluation involved the use of two devices for collecting atmospheric
samples. The samples collected were to permit the determination of the kinds
and amounts of contaminant compounds in the crew compartment. These samplings
were accomplished under Flight Test Objectives (FTO's) 264-01 and 264-02.
This information was finally to be used to extrapolate contaminant gas buildup
for up to seven days. The main goal in these activities was to ensure that
the cabin atmosphere would be safe for future space crew operations.
Whole Gas Sample Results
Three cylinders containing atmospheric samples were returned to JSC. The
sequence in which the sampling cylinders were opened for sample acquisition
was not recorded. A total of 99 compounds were identified and quantitated
from the three cylinders used for sampling.
Absorbed Gas Sample Results
Although the air sampler assembly was only placed in Day I (position "1"),
compounds were detected in all seven positions of the device. A total of 86
compounds were identified in the analyses of the air sampler assembly con-
tents.
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RADIOLOGICALHEALTH
Robert G. Richmond
It has been shown that manned space flight results in exposure of astronauts
to a radiation environment that is significantly more complex than that nor-
mally associated with the radiological health environment for industrial
workers. In space, the radiation environment can be considered to be composed
of three components: (I) particles trapped by the Earth's magnetic field (the
Van Allen radiation belts); (2) particles of solar origin (those particles
customarily associated with solar flare activity); and (3)galactic cosmic
rays and their secondary components. Historically the radiation dose received
by crew members has been minimal. Carefully conceived operational procedures
and the selection of judicious flight profiles have played a major role in
minimizing radiation exposures to the crews.
A record of all radiation exposure received by the astronauts is maintained as
part of the astronaut's medical record. The measured dose of radiation
encountered by the space crew during each mission is added to the individual
crewman's medical record.
As in the case of the STS-I dosimetry, the measurements obtained in the STS-2
mission (See Table I) indicate a very small radiation exposure. This is not
an unexpected situation because of the low inclination and altitude of the
flight profile and the short duration of the mission.
TABLE 1 SUMMARYOF RADIATIONMEASUREMENTSFORSTS-2
DOSIMETER TLD** POCKETDOSIMETER
S/N LOCATION DOSE(MRad) DOSE(mR)
0201 COMMANDER 7.5 + 2.0 NONEWORN
0202 PILOT 9.2 ¥ 2.1 NONEWORN
0205 POUCH1" 12.5 ¥ 2.2 16 2.0
0206 POUCH2* 12.1 ¥ 2.2 12 1.7
0207 POUCH3* Ii.0 2.1 I0 1.4
0208 POUCH4* 15.0 2.3 13 1.7
0209 POUCH5* 10.5 2.1 13 1.7
0210 POUCH6* 10.9 2.1 II 1.5
NOTE: These values have been corrected for background
NOTE: TLD doses in mRAD, pocket dosimeters in mroentgen
* Pouches not deployed.
** Avg. value of I CaF2 (TLD-200) and I LiF (TLD 700), Benton,
et al., Ref. I.
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CABINACOUSTICALNOISE
JerryL. Homick,Ph.D.
All of the noise levels measured on STS-2 were considerablyin excess of the
level (55 dBA) specifiedby JSC Standard 145. Noise levels at several loca-
tions (e.g., forward avionics bay, WCS operation, ARS servicing housing and
aft air outlet)exceeded the level (76 dBA) beyond which permanentphysiolog-
ical damage to the crewmen's auditory system may be expected to occur. It
should be noted, however, that these high readings were obtained with the
sound level meter microphonein very close proximityto the noise source or in
an air flow. Such measurement conditions would lead to artificial results
which would not be representativeof the real noise at the crewman'sear.
Octave Band SPL
Hz 63 125 250 500 1K 2K 4K 8K dBA
JSC Standard145 (NC50) 73 66 60 55 52.5 50 48 47.5 55
Flight Deck (aft overheadwindow) 65 64 58 59 66 62 62 48 67*
F5 Air Outlet (Fit. Deck) 76
Aft Air Outlet (Fit. Deck) 77
Sleep Location (Fit. Deck, Seats) 61
Sleep Location (Fit. Deck, Floor 59 60 63 57 61 56 51 44 64
behind Seats)
Mid-Deck Center (Mid-deck) 68*
IMU Inlet (Mid-deck) 64 63 66 57 62 62 61 55 68
CeilingAir Outlet (Mid-deck) 71
FWD Avionics Bay (Mid-deck) 80
WCS Air Inlet (Mid-deck) 75
WCS Operation(Mid-deck) 87
ARS ServicingHousing (Mid-deck) 77
Two measurement locations (those marked with an * in the above Table) were
common to STS-I. The noise levels measured at these locations were very
similar on both flights.
From a physiologicalpoint of view the noise levelsmeasured on STS-2 were not
hazardousto the crewmen'shearing. Continuousexposure to the measuredmid-
deck noise spectrumfor periods up to 7 days in duration would not cause per-
manent hearingdamage. However, some temporaryhearingthresholdshiftscould
be expected. These temporary shifts could have subtle effectson speech com-
munications and auditory signal detection. It was for this reason that JSC
earlier developed a guideline which recommended that in spacecraft noise
environmentsbetween65 dBA and 75 dBA hearingprotectiondevicesbe worn dur-
ing sleep to permit recoveryfrom noise inducedtemporarythresholdshifts.
During postflight crew debriefingsthe STS-2 crew stated that noise did not
appear to interferewith sleep, nor did noise interferewith communications.
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ENVIRONMENTALEFFECTSOF SHUTTLE
Andrew Potter,Ph.D.
The environmentaleffectsof the exhaustcloud producedby the launch of STS-2
were monitored at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Sonic booms were
measured during STS-2 Orbiter reentry and landing at Edwards Air Force Base
(EAFB),California the measurementstations were clusteredaround the maximum
overpressurezone near EAFB.
Launch ExhaustCloud Measurements
The launch generateda cloud of exhaust products,averagingabout 1000 meters
in diameter, which moved southward along the Banana River at an altitude of
about 1500 meters. The cloud was composed of aluminumoxide dust, liquid HCI
aerosol, and gaseous HCI, plus small amounts of fine particulatesswept up
from the launch pad area.
TABLE 1
METEOROLOGICALCONDITIONSFOR STS-2 LAUNCH
ALTITUDE
PARAMETER SURFACE 1047 m 3048 m
Cloud Bottom Cloud Top
Dry Temp.(°C) 22.4 11.7 5.6
Wind Speed (m/sec) 7.7 8.8 8.8
Wind Direction(deg) 338 28 354
RelativeHumidity(&) 67 100 17
BarometricPressure 1016.0 900.0 707.0
(mb)
The launch exhaust cloud produceda falloutof acidic dust and mist similarto
STS-I. The falloutdid not produce significantharm to personnel,vegetation,
or automobiles. It now seems likely that the fallout is associatedwith the
deluge water, and will occur for most, if not all, future launches. Surface
concentrationsof gaseous HCI were negligibly small in both STS-I and STS-2
launches. Airborne concentrationsof HCI were similar in both launches to
values previouslyobservedin a Titan cloud.
Sonic boom levels produced by Orbiter reentry were about 10-20% less than
expected, possibly due to the strong cross-winds,which may have blown the
maximum overpressureregion away from the measurementstations.
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MEDICALINFORMATIONMANAGEMENT
EdwardC. Moseley,Ph.D.
The STS-1 Medical Report (December 1981) indicated the need for increased
automation of Medical Operations. Further, the report documented progress
made by STS-1 toward completing some major automation objectives including
progress in hardware, software, security, data organization,input formats,
and standardizedreporting. These same resourceswere utilized in STS-2.
All hardware, software, data organization,and input formats used for both
STS-1 and STS-2 worked well. New access codes were issued for STS-2 and a
formal approval procedure for data access was established and followed.
Better security training was provided to all medical personneland each were
instructed on how to change their own password at any time. In addition,
stepswere taken to protectthe physical integrityof the data by periodically
storingthe latest disk file in a vault located in another part of the build-
ing. In general, the improved STS-2 security systems worked well although
additionalimprovementswere identifiedand are currentlyin work.
Training in utilizationof the systemby Flight Surgeonsas well as Biomedical
Engineerswas more timely and complete.
Information systems installed for STS-1 and reused for STS-2 worked well.
Prior to STS-2, a variety of new features were added to the Medical Informa-
tion ManagementSystem. Among these were the capabilityfor electronicmail,
blood/urine trend displays, family and medical history, previous physical
examinations,a program to aid in generating and distributingshift reports,
and menus to aid in selectingthe desired information. A new graphics termi-
nal and hardcopy unit were added to the Medical Staff Support Room in MCC.
Finally, improved securitymeasures were implemented. All of these additions
appearedto work well.
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MANAGEMENT,PLANNING,ANDIMPLEMENTATIONFMEDICALOPERATIONS
NormanBelasco
Section I
Managementof Medical Operations
The Medical Operations Management Objectives for STS-2 were organization,
implementation, and direction of a Medical Operations team that would effec-
tively and efficiently provide for:
o Assuring the health of flight personnel during all segments of the Shuttle
missions as well as providing medical management, analysis, treatment, and
expertise throughout the Shuttle OFT Program planning from preflight
through postflight phases.
o Required medical participation in program management, and for medical and
bioengineering expertise. Such tasks encompass the planning and implemen-
tation of incremental flight activities, procedures, training, and testing
as well as all other areas or specific items that have a direct or
indirect relationship to crew health, including Emergency Medical
Serv ices.
o Acquisition of data as an addition to the medical information base for
enhancing future manned flights, initiating as well as verifying selected
transitional changes in the Shuttle health care services (and procedures)
in preparation for the STS mature operation phase of the Space Shuttle.
In summary, all elements of the Medical Operations system functioned as inten-
ded throughout the mission preparation, preflight, inflight, landing and post-
landing phases.
Section II
Medical Operations Planning
The Medical Operations planning objectives were to provide coordinated, accu-
rate, comprehensive plans and planning activities, that would be the "roadmap"
for Medical Operations conduct and integration with the other Shuttle
operations facets.
The success of the readiness reviews, mission verification exercises, and
STS-2 mission support attest to the high quality of management, planning,
coordination, and implementation achieved in support of this second STS
flight. It is estimated that changes and improvements to the existing Medical
Operations system for STS-3 will be in the order of 3 percent, at most.
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